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Peering Over Illinois’ Fiscal Cliff:
New Projections from IGPA’s Fiscal Futures Model
By Richard Dye, Nancy Hudspeth and David Merriman
Are we looking at a crisis or a chronic condition?
Illinois’ fiscal situation has been precarious for at least a decade – and muchlonger if pension liabilities are considered. From FY 2003 to 2008, whichwere good years for economic activity and revenue collection, the General
Assembly and governor approved budgets with spending well in excess of
revenue. From that shaky starting point, the Great Recession of 2008 triggered
several years of fiscal crisis for the state. It is reasonable to ask whether the sit-
uation can still be defined as a crisis, “an unstable condition…involving an im-
pending abrupt or decisive change,”1 but that would miss a more important
point. It is clear that Illinois is still mired in a chronic condition that predates
the recession and constrains government’s ability to implement and administer
policies. Illinois’ fiscal condition contributes to economic and policy uncer-
tainty for citizens, businesses, nonprofit organizations, and local government.
After the recession tipped the state from chronic shortfall to crisis, Illinois mud-
dled through several years by taking on more debt, using one-time sources of
revenue, paying bills late, and with substantial fiscal help from the federal gov-
ernment. By late 2010 it had become clear that major adjustments would be nec-
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to take some corrective action, the Illinois legislature
and governor agreed on a package of fiscal policies
in January 2011. The policies included temporary in-
creases in the personal and corporate income tax
rates and limits to General Funds spending.2 In
terms of revenue, the most important changes were
the increase in the personal and corporate income
tax rates. The income tax rates scheduled in the Jan-
uary 2011 law are:
Since January 2011, Illinois has faced continued se-
vere fiscal problems but has navigated annual
budget challenges by making use of borrowing,
one-time revenue, fund balance reductions, inter-
fund transfers, and other short-term fixes.3 On
some matters, in some years, the legislature has
given the governor increased discretion to make
budget cuts. Most government functions have con-
tinued to operate, there has been limited public
outcry, and political leaders have, for the most part,
retained their positions.
Despite the appearance of normalcy, Illinois’ fiscal
difficulties have had important and tangible nega-
tive effects. Perhaps the most visible has been the
large backlog of unpaid bills (discussed below) that
has greatly inconvenienced many vendors that sup-
ply the state government with goods and services. 
Another important effect has been a steady deteri-
oration in the state’s credit rating. Illinois now has
the lowest credit rating and highest borrowing
costs of the 50 states. The “Illinois effect” on bor-
rowing costs4 has also affected local governments.
Illinois’ state workforce has shrunk and many gov-
ernment tasks are performed more slowly, or less
completely, than in the past.
In parallel with its chronic and nagging structural im-
balance, the long-term challenges that Illinois faces
due to its unfunded liabilities5 – particularly liabilities
for pensions promised to teachers and state workers
– have received heightened public and legislative at-
tention. Largely due to many years of scheduled un-
derfunding, Illinois accumulated unfunded pension
obligations on the order of $100 billion. Pension pay-
ments were scheduled to rise rapidly over the next
several years, exacerbating an already difficult state
financial situation. Even these escalating pension
contributions were too small to keep Illinois’ un-
funded pension liabilities from growing over the next
decade. The enactment of a two-tiered system with
higher contributions from, and lower benefits to, em-
ployees hired starting in 2011 was a huge step, but is
already factored into these projections. 
In December 2013, important legislation dramati-
cally revised Illinois’ public pension systems.
Should this legislation survive a constitutional
challenge, unfunded liabilities will be reduced to
zero in 25 years. Unfortunately, it did not solve the
state’s fiscal problems. 
Since 2008, the Fiscal Futures Project has carefully
tracked the state of Illinois’ revenue and expendi-
tures and developed an empirical model of the
state budget.6 Using this historical budget data,
information about past economic performance,
Calendar Pre- 2011- 2015- Post-
Year 2011 2014 2024 2024
Personal Rate 3.0% 5.0% 3.75% 3.25%
Corporate Rate 4.8% 7.0% 5.25% 4.8%
1 The Free Dictionary http://www.thefreedictionary.com/crisis
2 More detail on legislative actions are given at http://igpa.uillinois.edu/IR12/pdfs/ILReport2012Ch4budgetW.pdf.
3 See http://igpa.uillinois.edu/IR13/chap02.php for more details.
4 See: Luby and Moldogaziev, “The Scarlet Letter in the Municipal Bond Market: ‘Unpacking’ the Risk Premium on State of Illinois’ Debt.”
Forthcoming.
5 For more details see Report of the State Budget Crisis Task Force: Illinois Report. 2012. http://www.statebudgetcrisis.org/wpcms/
wp-content/images/2012-10-12-Illinois-Report-Final-2.pdf.
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projections of future economic activity,
and well-documented standard analyt-
ical techniques, we are able to calculate
measures of Illinois’ past fiscal health
and are able to project its future fiscal
performance under a variety of policy
choices and economic conditions. We
believe that it is crucial that public lead-
ers and the general public understand
the implications of the fiscal policy
choices currently being discussed in
Illinois, and here we use our model to
analyze some of them. In particular, we
calculate the baseline fiscal situation
under current Illinois law – if the tem-
porary tax increases expire as sched-
uled – and an alternative scenario, which assumes
that the higher rates are made permanent.
Our looking glass: the structural gap in the
consolidated funds budget
Assessments of Illinois’ fiscal condition and changes
in that condition can vary greatly depending on the
frame of reference used to do the analyses, as we
have documented elsewhere.7 In our analyses, we
use a carefully chosen and consistent frame of
reference that provides a realistic assessment of
Illinois’ fiscal situation. In particular, our Fiscal
Futures Model uses a budget concept we call Con-
solidated Funds, which is much broader than the
more commonly reported General Funds. The ra-
tionale is that with the broader measure, account-
ing changes or transfers between funds will not be
confused with a real change in the state’s revenue
or expenditures.
Structural budget gap. The Illinois Constitution
limits appropriations for the upcoming budget year
to “funds estimated to be available,” which is in-
terpreted to include pre-existing account balances
or new borrowing, in addition to projected tax col-
lections, federal grants, and various fees. Our pre-
ferred measure of the state’s fiscal condition is:
Structural Budget Gap = 
Total Revenue – Total Spending
where “total revenue” includes the annual flow of
taxes, grants and fees but not the one-time use of
asset balances or new borrowing. This
measure focuses on sustainable rev-
enue and thus the underlying or struc-
tural fiscal situation.
Note that the gap can be either posi-
tive, zero or negative. A positive gap
(revenue > spending) is called a struc-
tural surplus; a zero gap is called a
structurally balanced budget; and a
negative gap (revenue < spending) is
called a structural deficit.
Baseline projections of Illinois’ struc-
tural budget gap. Figure 1 presents
projections of the structural gap in the
consolidated funds budget from the most recent
version of the Fiscal Futures Model.8 Illinois had a
structural gap of about -$2 billion (a deficit of $2 bil-
lion) in FY 2005 to 2008. With the nationwide crisis
in financial, housing, and employment markets, the
structural deficit grew to $8 billion in FY 2010. The
state’s budget gap was less negative – the deficit
was smaller – in FY 2011 and 2012. Preliminary fig-
ures for 2013 suggest a small positive gap or surplus
in the Consolidated Funds budget (which, as is ex-
plained later, was used to reduce the backlog of un-
paid bills from previous years).
Starting from an estimated deficit of roughly $1 bil-
lion in FY 2014, the state’s fiscal situation is projected
– under current law and estimated rates of growth in
revenue and spending – to deteriorate steadily and
reach a structural deficit of $14 billion in FY 2025.
Each year, growth in revenue that is less than growth
in spending adds $1 billion or so to the deficit, and
the scheduled decline in tax rates makes the de-
clines from 2014-2016 and 2024-2025 even larger.
The Consolidated Funds budget gap does not cap-
ture the full extent of the state’s fiscal problems.
The baseline Fiscal Futures Model (Figure 1) projects
a negative structural budget gap for each year from
2015 to 2025. These are projections of “would be”
deficits with “current trends” or “current policy”
which do not account for how a deficit in one year
could affect the budget in following years. A deficit
can be avoided with tax increases or spending cuts;
or a deficit has to be funded with decreases in asset
holdings or increases in liabilities (such as new debt).
Starting from an
estimated deficit of
roughly $1 billion in
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Avoiding or funding a deficit affects the fiscal situa-
tion in future years. Higher taxes diminish the pub-
lic’s ability to pay in the future. Lower spending now
could increase the need for services later. Decreases
in financial asset holdings diminish investment in-
come and reserves in the future. Failure to keep up
with depreciation of infrastructure and government
buildings means higher costs or lower services in the
future. Explicit borrowing backed by bonds means
a greater claim on future government revenue to pay
contractual debt service. It also means higher interest
rates. Borrowing by delaying payment to vendors
raises costs to the state in the future as some suppli-
ers are driven out of business and others become re-
luctant to do business with the state. Increases in
unfunded pension or retiree health care liabilities are
implicit forms of borrowing that represent a greater
claim on future government revenue, thus crowding
out the ability to pay for other things.
An ideal measure of the fiscal situation would com-
bine the flow of current revenue and spending with
changes in assets and changes in liabilities. Assets
would include both financial accounts or holdings
and physical assets properly adjusted to include de-
preciation or deterioration. Liabilities would include
explicit borrowing and also implicit borrowing like
the increases in unfunded pension promises that have
contributed so much to the state’s current situation.
7 For more information, please see work by The Fiscal
Futures Project on transparency in budgeting:
http://igpa.uillinois.edu/system/files/Fiscal%20Futures
%20Budget%20Transparency%20Report.pdf
8 Please see Fiscal Futures Project Documentation (October
2013), http://igpa.uillinois.edu/system/files/fiscal_
futures_documentation_21oct13.pdf for details on the
model and citation of sources of data. The projections in
Figures 1 and 2 do not include the impact of the
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On the fiscal cliff looking at the sunset of
higher tax rates
The phase-out of the higher income tax rates is
scheduled to begin January 1, 2015, which affects
half of FY 2015. Figure 2 presents projections of the
Fiscal Futures Model for 2014-2025 with two sce-
narios. The blue line repeats the baseline – current
tax law – projections already presented in Figure 1.
The red line presents an alternative scenario where
the law is changed to keep the higher rates perma-
nent (personal income tax rates remain at 5 percent
and corporate tax rates remain at 7 percent).
Figure 2 illustrates that tax collections at the higher
rate would be about $5 billion more – the deficit
would be about $5 billion lower – each year for the
FY 2016 to 2024 period. Maintaining the higher
rates would also avoid another decline in revenue
in FY 2025. Note, however, that even if the higher
tax rates were made permanent, the budget gap
will continue to worsen – going from -$1 billion in
2014 to -$7 billion in 2025. Higher tax rates alone
will not solve the state’s structural fiscal problems.
Pension payments and unfunded liabilities:
before and after pension law changes
Prior to the December 2013 changes, the state of Illi-
nois had unfunded pension liabilities on the order
of $100 billion and was scheduled to make large
payments to the pension systems each year (grow-
ing from about $7 billion in FY 2015 to $17 billion in
FY 2045). Should the pension law changes survive
a constitutional challenge, the fiscal impact will be:9
• A large initial reduction in unfunded liabilities
in the year of adoption; 
• Elimination of the remaining unfunded liabili-
ties over the next 25 years;
• A large reduction in payments by the state to the
pension systems after 20 or 25 years; 
• BUT, only a small reduction in scheduled pay-
ments over the next 10 years.
Figure 3 illustrates the last point. The solid blue line



































Baseline: Tax Rates Drop as Scheduled



































































Baseline: Tax rates drop as scheduled
(+17.1 in 2014)
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Illinois Consolidated Funds Structural Budget
Gap Projections to FY 2025 With and Without
Phase-Out of Higher Income Tax Rates after
2014 and 2024
Figure 3
Illinois Consolidated Funds Structural
Budget Gap Projections to FY 20225 with 
(1) Baseline Gap, (2) New Pension Law
Spending, (3) New Pension Lawand Gap
Adjusted for Change in Unfunded Pension
Liabilities (With Existing Tax Law in All Cases) 
Source: IGPA's Fiscal Futures Project Source: IGPA's Fiscal Futures Project
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The dashed blue line shows the smaller gap due to
the roughly $1 billion annual reduction in sched-
uled pension spending under the new law for each
of the next 10 years. 
An alternative measure of the budget gap. Direct
payments for salaries are clearly part of current
spending. But an increase in IOUs for future pensions
– either for new pension benefits earned by workers
in the current year or by getting farther behind on
funding benefits earned from past years of work –
also represents a real cost to future taxpayers. Recog-
nition of this new liability as part of the fiscal burden
suggests an alternative measure of the budget gap:
Alternative Budget Gap =
Total Revenue – Total Spending – Change in
Unfunded Pension Liability
Official projections for pre-December 2013 pension
law are that for the next 10 or more years unfunded
pension liabilities will get $2-3 billion larger each
year.10 The dotted green line in Figure 3 shows the
alternative budget gap with official projections of
post-December 2013 pension payments and the
change in unfunded liabilities. The large initial re-
duction in unfunded liabilities due to the December
2013 pension law changes results in a (literally off-
the-chart) surplus of $17.1 billion in FY 2014. From
FY 2020 to FY 2025 there are additional reductions
in unfunded liabilities ranging from $0.5 billion to
$2.0 billion – seen as the smaller adjusted gap (dot-
ted green line) compared to the cash gap (dashed
blue line) for post-December 2013 pension rules.
The projected cash budget gap for 2025 is $13 bil-
lion with lower state contributions in the new pen-
sion law or $11 billion if additional adjustment is
made for pay-down of unfunded liabilities. Pen-
sion law revision is crucial for the state, but the re-
cent pension law changes alone will not cure the
state’s chronic fiscal imbalance.
Another cloud in the budget picture: 
year-to-year changes in unpaid bills 
Increases in unpaid bills are an implicit form of bor-
rowing, a way to finance a negative budget gap.
Illinois was able to meet its obligations (other than
pensions) through the early 2000s, but experienced
a period of fiscal stress following the recession in
2001. The state ended FY 2003 with unpaid bills of
$900 million, but the backlog declined to zero by
the end of FY 2007.11
As the economy and tax collections slowed again
at the start of the Great Recession, there was a surge
of about $1 billion in unpaid bills in FY 2008. Figure





















































Unpaid Bills for All Funds (Not Just General
Funds) from FY 2007 to FY 2013*
9 For details and sources of information, see Dye,
Richard F., Nancy Hudspeth and David Merriman, “Illi-
nois Still Has Serious Fiscal Problems After December
2013 Pension Law Changes,” http://igpa.uillinois.edu/
system/files/Pension-Reform-Will-Not-Fix-Deficit.pdf.
10 This case is not shown in Figure 3, but the alternative
gap would $2-3 billion larger than the cash gap repre-
sented by the solid blue line. See Dye, Richard F.,
Nancy Hudspeth and David Merriman, “Illinois Still
Has Serious Fiscal Problems After December 2013
Pension Law Changes,” http://igpa.uillinois.edu/
system/files/Pension-Reform-Will-Not-Fix-Deficit.pdf.
11 Illinois Office of the Comptroller, Comptroller’s Quar-
terly, FY 2002-2007. Source: IGPA's Fiscal Futures Project*Illinois Office of the Comptroller, Comptroller’s Quarterly, FY 2007-2013.
Does not include invoices held at agencies before warrants (authorizations
to pay) are issued. 2008 is an estimate.
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all funds, not just the General Funds) for FY 2007
to 2013. The increase in unpaid bills in each year
from FY 2008 to 2011 allowed Illinois to finance part
its negative budget gap – ranging from $1 billion to
$3 billion – and to spend more than it was receiving
in revenue.
With the tax increase and spending cuts beginning
in FY 2011, the backlog of unpaid bills decreased by
$1 billion from FY 2011 to 2012, and by another $1.4
billion from FY 2012 to 2013. This improvement was
possible only by running a surplus – by spending
less than revenue – in the rest of the budget. This is
also why the $700 million Consolidated Funds
budget surplus for FY 2013 shown in Figure 1 was
not a reason to declare an end to Illinois’ long-run-
ning fiscal crisis. At the end of FY 2013 there were
still $6.1 billion in unpaid bills from previous years
that must be paid from future revenue, thus crowd-
ing out future spending on other priorities. 
Projections: growth in revenue and spending
Projected growth rates. In order to better under-
stand the options that Illinois has to rectify its cur-
rent and potential future fiscal imbalances, it is
important to look at the forces driving government
revenue and expenditures. We obtain our projec-
tions of Illinois’ future fiscal condition by projecting
growth in 16 components of revenue and 17 com-
ponents of spending. Each budget component has
one or more variables (such as personal income
growth, or demographic change) that drive our
projection.12 Projections of the state’s fiscal future
are based on past statistical relationships between
the driver variables and the budgetary components
and the future paths of the driver variables.
Figure 5 shows our projections of the annual aver-
age nominal growth rates of revenue components
from 2015 to 2025. We compare these growth rates
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Projected Growth (Percent per Year)
Federal Funds—Medicaid ($7.6 billion)
Federal Funds—Transport ($1.7 billion)
Federal Funds—Other ($7.0 billion)
Personal Income Tax ($16.5 billion)
General Sales Tax ($9.9 billion)
Corporate Income Tax ($4.4 billion)
Motor Fuel/Vehicle/Operator ($3.0 billion)
Gambling ($2.0 billion)
Excise Taxes ($1.8 billion)
Healthcare Provider Taxes ($1.7 billion)
Public Utility Tax ($1.5 billion)
Licenses, Fees & Registrations ($0.9 billion)
Corporate Franchise Tax ($0.2 billion)
Fines, Penalties & Violations ($0.1 billion)
Investment Income ($0.04 billion)
Other Cash Receipts ($8.2 billion)
Total Receipts ($66.6 billion)
CPI In!ation (2.0%) Personal Income Growth (3.4%)
Figure 5
Projected Growth Rates by Revenue Category for FY 2015-2025
Source: IGPA's Fiscal Futures Project
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to the projected rate of inflation (2 percent) and per-
sonal income growth (3.4 percent). Based on historical
data and current law, we project that revenue from
the personal income tax and public utility tax will
grow more slowly than the CPI. Three of the revenue
sources with the highest projected growth rates – fed-
eral funds for Medicaid, federal funds for transporta-
tion, and health care provider taxes – grow only
because the model links them to a high-growing ex-
penditure category.13 Only the relatively small rev-
enue categories of excise taxes; licenses, fees and
registrations; and fines, penalties, and violations are
projected to grow more rapidly than personal income.
Total receipts will grow just a little faster than inflation
but considerably slower than personal income.
Figure 6 shows growth projections on the expendi-
ture side. Based on historical data, we project that
the large categories of Medicaid, elementary and
secondary education, and transportation will grow
faster than personal income. State employee health
care is currently a relatively small category but is
projected to grow at the astonishingly rapid rate of
more than 8 percent per year. Only four categories
of spending are projected to grow more slowly than
inflation. Together these slow-growing spending
categories accounted for less spending than Medi-
caid. We project total expenditures to grow slightly
faster than personal income.
The fiscal challenge facing Illinois is made clear
by Figures 5 and 6. Almost two-thirds of Illinois’
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Projected Growth (Percent per Year)
Medicaid ($16.5 billion)
Elementary & Secondary Educ. ($8.7 billion)
Human Services ($6.9 billion)
Pensions ($5.8 billion)
Transfer Revenue to Local Govts. ($5.6 billion)
Transportation including Tollway ($5.1 billion)
   Higher Education ($2.3 billion)
State Employee Health Care ($2.1 billion)
Management, Legislative, Judicial ($1.9 billion)
Corrections ($1.2 billion)
Public Safety, Health & Regulation ($1.1 billion)
Economic Development ($1.0 billion)
Environmental, Resource & Agric. ($0.8 billion)
Capital Improvements ($0.5 billion)
Labor & Employment Security ($0.3 billion)
Other Expenditures ($2.8 billion)
Total Expenditures ($65.9 billion)
CPI In!ation (2.0%) Personal Income Growth (3.4%)
Figure 6
Projected Growth Rates by Spending Category for FY 2015-2025  
12 See Fiscal Futures Project Documentation, October 2013,
http://igpa.uillinois.edu/system/files/fiscal_futures_
documentation_21oct13.pdf for more detail.
13 Ibid.
Source: IGPA's Fiscal Futures Project
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revenue comes from federal funds, the personal in-
come tax and the general sales tax. Of these, only
federal funds are likely to grow as fast as personal
income and, considering the fiscal pressures facing
the federal government, that may not happen. In
contrast, the largest components of spending (Med-
icaid and elementary and secondary education) are
both likely to grow faster than personal income.
Sensitivity of budget gap projections to changes
in revenue growth. Projections of the future
growth of spending and revenue categories are
based on projections of the highly uncertain future
growth path of Illinois’ economy. A better economy
could mean both higher revenue from income and
sales taxes, and slower growth in counter-cyclical
expenditure components such as Medicaid and
human services.
To explore this possibility, we projected both rev-
enue and spending assuming that personal income
grew one-half of 1 percent per year faster (or
slower) than our baseline projections. One-half of
1 percent additional growth per year is quite opti-
mistic from a baseline growth rate of only a little
more than 3 percent per year.14 Unfortunately, our
calculations suggest that even if Illinois’ economy
performed better than our forecast there would be
little improvement in its net fiscal situation com-
pared to the baseline. The reason is that, based on
historical experience as incorporated in our model,
higher economic growth raises both revenue and
spending by roughly the same amount, so the net
impact on the projected budget gap (revenue
minus spending) is small.
Perhaps the future could be different from the past.
Illinois faces extreme fiscal challenges, and policy-
makers might be able to restrain spending even if
economic growth raised revenue. We altered our sim-
ulations to assume that baseline spending was unaf-
fected, but that revenue was altered by changes in
personal income. Figure 7 shows baseline results (the
solid line) and optimistic (one-half percent additional
growth in personal income) and pessimistic (one-half
percent reduction growth in personal income) sce-
narios assuming baseline growth in expenditures.
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Sensitivity of Consolidated Funds Structural Budget Gap Projections to One-Half of One Percent
Per Year Higher or Lower Growth in Revenue Drivers (With Existing Tax Law and Pre-December
2013 Pension Law)
14 Trustees of Social Security increase productivity by only 0.3
percent per year when running their optimistic scenario
(http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/tr/2013/tr2013.pdf, Table V.B1).
Source: IGPA's Fiscal Futures Project
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fiscal balance would improve only modestly – even
after 10 years of compounding higher revenue
growth. Instead of a $14 billion deficit in 2025 we
project a deficit of just under $12 billion. This exer-
cise illustrates the fact that Illinois has a chronic
structural fiscal imbalance. 
Another look: summary and conclusion
The use of Consolidated Funds improves our un-
derstanding of Illinois’ fiscal picture because move-
ments from General Funds to non-General Funds
are not confused with real changes in the state’s ex-
penditures and revenue. The elimination of one-
time revenue sources from the budget gap
calculation improves our understanding of Illinois’
fiscal condition because it focuses on spending rel-
ative to sustainable revenue.
The Fiscal Futures Model estimates a current struc-
tural budget gap of -$4 billion and projects that
under current law the gap will get progressively
worse, reaching -$14 billion by FY 2025 (Figure 1). 
Keeping income tax rates at their current levels,
rather than letting them decline as scheduled, would
raise only about half of the extra revenue that would
be needed to eliminate the gap (Figure 2). 
In addition to the large projected gaps between the
annual flows of revenue and spending, the state
began FY 2014 with short-term liabilities of $6 billion
in unpaid bills, and in the
longer term has to deal
with unfunded pension li-
abilities on the order of
$100 billion. The Decem-
ber 2013 revisions to Illi-
nois pension law will, if
they survive a constitu-
tional challenge, eliminate
the unfunded liability, but
it will take 25 years. The
new pension law is pro-
jected to reduce state pay-
ments to the pension funds by only about $1 billion
each year over the next decade, which reduces the
gap for FY 2025 to -$12.4 billion. Pension changes
are crucial to the state, but alone do not eliminate
the structural imbalance.
Thus, it seems clear that Illinois’ current revenue
and spending policies are unsustainable. Illinois
has a chronic, structural fiscal problem and must
either take action to reduce spending, increase rev-
enue, or some combination, to avoid facing fiscal
imbalances for many years to come.
Richard F. Dye is an economist at the Institute of Gov-
ernment and Public Affairs. Nancy Hudspeth is a re-
search policy analyst at IGPA. David Merriman is an
economist at IGPA and a professor of public adminis-
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of the extra revenue
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to eliminate the gap.
